



ACTS AND INHIBITION

SCHOOL OF PSYCHOANALYSIS OF THE FORUMS OF LACANIAN FIELD

Analysts are concerned with the analytic act. It has not always been that way. It took Lacan to introduce a new dimension into psychoanalysis, by making the analytic act the model for every act, so that the question become crucial for psychoanalysis and beyond. Our meeting is situated in this perspective and renews interrogation of the different modalities of the act, its function and obstacles to it, in light of our present day clinic. We decided to link inhibition and acts. The plural indicates that the act is not unique or forever. it is not part of a homogeneous series, for acts necessitate a first act, a founding act: the veritable act of the birth of the subject. Lacan gave it a name : the act of speaking, by which one becomes a subject, which necessitates, not only being connected to language, but more fundamentally, appropriating it. But this act, even if it conditions what follows, proves to be insufficient if it is not renewed. Whence arises the question: what does one call an act in the life of a subject? Lacan asserts that the only possible assessment is from what follows from it, that is to say, the après-coup. Logically, this leads us to what deviates from it: the failures of the act which range from failed acts to pathologies of act, including acting out and passages to the act. Their distinction, their emergence, at the beginning or during the course of an analysis, require that we elucidate how these phenomena are tackled clinically. One also encounters the plural—the acts—in the experience of analysis, for there is the act of the analyst that starts the process, the act in the treatment, and then the act at the end which will have an effect on the act of the subject.

Now for the other part: inhibition. While its forms vary and, according to Freud, have to do with different types of bodily functions, inhibition in the singular is justified, given that, as Lacan tells us, the Freudian tripod “inhibition, symptom, and anguish,” is equivalent in its heterogeneity to the tripod of “imaginary

symbolic, and real,” insofar as there exists a sharp distinction between these terms.

What, then, is the specificity of inhibition? It is to be distinguished from impediments that are manifest or hidden, and its forms are diverse. It is therefore implied in the formula “I am not able....” at the beginning of an analysis. It is equally part of the “I understand, but nothing is changing,” and also concerns the “how to finish my analysis?”

The crucial question is thus to know whether treatment of inhibition necessarily goes through its transformation into a symptom. In evoking inhibition, we are necessarily brought to one of the paths that Freud posited as a destiny of feminine sexuality, that of inhibition by way of renunciation of the phallus. Lacan approached it more broadly as linked to the right to the phallus, which explains its manifestation in both men and women. How can we not also evoke the prevalence, in analyses, of what one may call intellectual inhibition. The wish to not know, of which there can be a residue even in analysts, in the formulation “I am not able to write.” It is certain that analytic issues of inhibition all go through the unconscious. We still need to show how the analytic act extracts a subject from his or her slide into inhibition, on which the question of “how to finish my analysis” depends. And more fundamentally, what is the effect of a School of Psychoanalysis on the act of the analyst. These are the questions which we invite analysts and all who are interested in the analytic discourse to address.

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